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The political economy of cross-border 
relations 
The TNI and East TiDlor 
Damien Kingsbury 
Abstract: Within a framework of formally increasingly cordial bi-
lateral relations, the Indonesian military, the TNI, was engaging in 
and allowing extensive cross-border trade and smuggling while 
pursuing a policy of limited cross-border destabilization of East 
Timor. This seemingly contradictory policy, run from the TNI's 'stra-
tegic command centre' in Atambua, West Timor, met the TNI's 
continuing need to fund its own activities (and those of its proxies) 
through both legal and illegal means, to provide leverage for the 
coming talks about the formal demarcation of the border, and to 
provide a foothold to longer-term irredentist claims to the former 
occupied province and now independent state. 
Keywords: military; military business; smuggling; bilateral 
relations; militias 
There seemed little but lush vegetation along the broken road when, 
around a sharp ascending corner, appeared green bamboo fences and 
arches decorated with bright'wild flowers. Within a moment the reason 
became clear, and about 80 or so people, all well dressed and many in 
regional costume, performed the traditional B so' ot dance of step-for-
ward-step-sideways to a woman's quick rhythmic beat of an old brass 
sene (gong). It was, of course, a wedding. This moving scene was just 
a short distance from Hatolia, a mountain village that was fulsomely 
terrorized and ultimately destroyed by the Naga Merah (Red Dragon) 
militia in 1999, with what little was left being razed by many of East 
Timor's other militias retreating inland through it towards the West 
Timor border~ When the first UN 'Peace Keeping Force' (PKF) en-
tered East Timor in late September 1999, its first move after securing 
Dili and the coast road was to form a pincer movement to prevent the 
realization of the public threat by militia leaders Joao Tavares and Eurico 
Guterres to partition the two westernmost districts of Bobonaro and 
South East Asia Research, 11, 3, pp. 269-296 
270 South East Asia Research 
Cova Lima. The movement, then, was to prevent the continuing loss of 
civilian life and destruction of property (although the latter was largely 
complete by this stage), the effective kidnapping of more civilians to 
West Timor, and the removal of critical documents. The PKF also needed 
to establish that, if pressed, it would not avoid a fight. The main con-
frontation occurred near the point of this wedding party, where dozens 
of militia refused to surrender, and were shot by PKF troops (Anon [a], 
2002) along what is now colloquially known as 'Militia Ridge'. As 
with much of what happened in East Timor after the introduction of the 
PKF, this was neither publicly reported nor widely known. 
By mid-2003, the widespread belief outside East Timor was that all 
was fairly quiet along the East Timor-Indonesia border. However, as 
with the shootings of dozens of militia near Hatolia in late September 
1999, there is much that has not been officially reported. In large part 
this is in an attempt to preserve the appearance of increasingly cordial 
relations between Indonesia and East Timor, and between Indonesia 
and Australia, and to calm respective 'nationalist' or justice-inspired 
emotions that have the potential to destabilize the tripartite relation-
ship. In 2003, the main concerns with the Indonesia-East Timor border 
region revolved around the issues of cross-border trade, smuggling, 
militia activity, and the role played in this by the Indonesian military, 
the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). This paper considers these is-
sues, in particular as an illustration of the confluence of economic 
considerations with other agendas pursued by the TNI. 
The paper is based on primary research supported by secondary 
sources. A number of interviews cite anonymous sources, such ano-
nymity being a condition of providing information. Field research for 
this article was undertaken in East and West Timor, primarily in May 
2003, but also drawing on previous research visits to both East and 
West Timor undertaken in 1995, 1999 and twice in 2000. The approach 
employed relies on identifying consistencies in patterns of behaviour, 
especially those identified as economic imperatives that reflect or con-
tribute to political decisions. However, it also acknowledges that political 
outcomes can be driven by a confluence of mutually compatible inter-
ests, and that the rationale for particular actions is usually more complex 
and multifaceted than simple economic interest. The view that is adopted 
here, then, is that the TNI is driven by a range of mutually coherent 
interests, ranging from esprit de corps, state creation and maintenance 
(and, in the case of East Timor, elements of irredentism), the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the form the state takes, the bureaucratic 
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logic of organizational self-perpetuation, the need to 'supplement' the 
official online budget and to finance off-line proxies (militias), the in-
stitutionalization of corruption and, not least, the private interests of 
particular officers or groups of officers who directly benefit from the 
TNI's extensive legal and illegal (criminal) business activities. 
Background 
After three months of cross-border forays, in December 1975 Indone-
sia officially invaded East Timor, annexing the territory the following 
year (see Pour, 1993, pp 383-403 for a frank Indonesian account). This 
annexation was not recognized by the United Nations, and was deemed 
illegal under international law. Various estimates from the period of 
Indonesia's occupation claim that between 120,000 and 200,000 of the 
territory's population of around 650,000 were killed or died from re-
lated causes (ACFOA, 1991, P 3; Kiernan, 2003, suggests 
150,000-170,000; DFADTC, 2003, Chapter 5 cites 120,000-200,000). 
In order to establish itself in East Timor, the TNI appropriated local 
businesses and homes, began (or continued) direct trading relations 
with Singapore, and assumed control of the local economy, which had 
an export value of US$24.5 million in 1996 (Bappeda and BPS, 1998). 
Following the resignation of Suharto as Indonesia's president and under 
growing international pressure, at the beginning of 1999 his successor, B. 
J. Habibie, announced that East Timor would be allowed to vote on whether 
it wished to remain a part of Indonesia, or to separate. On 30 August 1999, 
following months of growing violence and destruction by TNI proxy 
militias, 78.5 % of registered voters chose to leave Indonesia, precipitating 
the murder of, officially, more than 1,500 people, and unofficially at least 
double and perhaps as many as four times that number (Anon [b], 2000; 
Anon [c], 2002). About 250,000 East Timorese either fled or were herded 
across the border into West Timor. In response to widespread domestic 
criticism, the Australian government organized a coalition of interested 
countries to contribute to a UN-sanctioned International Force in East 
Timor (Interfet), which quickly became the Peace Keeping Force (PKF) 
of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and 
later UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET). PKF forces 
flushed militia units from Dili and along the northern coast, circling back 
between the capital, Dili, and the West Timor border, in the above-men-
tioned 'pincer movement' , trapping many militia members in the Hatolia 
area. Apart from conflict in this area, for several weeks after the PKF 
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arranged itself along the East-West Timor border, there were 'militia' 
forays into East Timor, few of which were publicly acknowledged. It was 
clear from the equipment found on some 'militia' that they were almost 
certainly regular TNI personnel, and assumed to be serving or former 
members of Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khussus - Special Forces 
Command). After the loss of two PKF lives in such border contact, three 
UN personnel were murdered by a militia mob in Atambua, not far from 
the East Timor border. While most of those East Timorese forced to flee 
to West Timor returned over the following two years, more than 25,000 
chose to stay in West Timor, some fearing instability in East Timor, but 
most having links with or sympathy for the integrationist/militia movement. 
It was these people who formed the backbone of local trade across the 
border. 
The brief period of cessation and then the resumption of militia activity 
were reliant upon the status of the militia's 'centre of gravity' (defined 
as 'that characteristic from which a military force derives its freedom 
of action'), which was the direct support and involvement of the TN!. 
The cessation of militia activity was not secured by military force as 
such, but by pressure from the USA on the TNI. Perhaps the clearest 
expression of US intent was the landing in December 1999 of the fully 
armed US Marines 11 th Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 
in East Timor, with the public role of delivering relief supplies. This 
was later supported by further aid projects delivered by US Marines. 
But once the facade of normality had been established, and was largely 
preserved in the public eye, and the US Marines left in December 2002, 
despite the common perception that all remained stable, the TNI took 
advantage of again being free to act (Anon [x], 2003). 
The reform agenda 
The conventional view of Indonesian politics and the TNI in the period 
following May 1998 was that the state was undergoing a process of 
democratic transition and that the military was itself undergoing a process 
of reform (eg see Singh, 2001). Elaborations of this view held that, 
after 40 years of authoritarian military-backed government, Indonesia 
was following the Latin American example of shedding military inter-
vention in civil affairs through military 'professionalization' (see eg 
Stepan, 1976), corresponding to what Huntington referred to as 'The 
Third Wave' (Huntington, 1991). Surrounded by the rhetoric of reformasi 
(political reform) and the TNI's paradim baru (new paradigm) it was 
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indeed possible to believe that meaningful change in Indonesia was 
under way. However, fundamental aspects of Indonesia's political and 
economic history, ethnic and elite composition and its physical geog-
raphy all contributed to a different context from that of Latin America 
(and even Thailand; see Crone, 1991), while the TNI itself was com-
promised by its reliance on private and often illegal business, hence 
contributing to an outcome different from the successful moves away 
from military domination in Latin America. Moreover, even in Latin 
America, the success of bringing the military under civilian control 
was sometimes limited (Farcau, 1996, Chapter 5). As Philip summa-
rized military change: 
The military does not behave in any simple or one-dimensional way which can 
be deduced a priori . ... contemporary observers have been strikingly wrong in 
their expectations of military behaviour (Philip, 1985, p 356). 
One might have said the same for observers who suggested that the 
TNI was, after 1998, weakened relative to other state institutions, or 
successfully reforming. 
According to a wide range of sources in Jakarta, Indonesia's process 
of reformasi was halted around the time elected president Abdurrahman 
Wahid was deposed from office in a constitutional coup in July 2001, 
to be replaced by his more conservative vice-president Megawati 
Sukamoputri. Senior echelons of the TNI were opposed to Wahid's 
continuing presidential tenure and, following two meetings of senior 
officers in early 2001, helped undermine his presidency. Further, since 
Megawati has been president, the TNI has assumed greater political 
authority and autonomy in cabinet, in constitutional affairs and in se-
curity matters. The TNI's own process of 'professionalization' removed 
it from presidential control, but at the same time removed it from presi-
dential accountability. Further, the factionalism that damaged the TNI's 
capacity to act cohesively in the later years of Suharto's New Order 
government was largely resolved by early 2000, with both key 'Red 
and White' and 'Green' factions coalescing first around their common 
opposition to allowing East Timor to achieve independence, and later 
around efforts by President Wahid to promote reformist-minded gen-
erals. While distinctions within the TNI remained, they were largely 
personality-based and not fundamental to its operation. 
Similarly, the period of factionalism, especially from around 1993 
until 1999-2000, allowed the TNI to leave unchallenged the view that 
its operational lines of command were ineffective and that 'rogue ele-
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ments' or oknum (military gangsters, literally 'involved') operated out-
side of the formal structure. In fact, this was a camouflage for 
conventional TNI lines of control for policies for which it wished to 
avoid responsibility, such as the organization of East Timor's militias. 
Especially given the TNI's high degree of coherence around opposi-
tion to East Timor's independence and its use of East Timor to justify a 
regional presence, it is therefore not surprising that after the TNI mended 
its internal differences elsewhere, this previously agreed policy posi-
tion remained intact. 
TNI business 
There is a view of Indonesian politics that has it that the TNI's primary 
consideration is not the protection of the people, the imposition of 'sta-
bility' or even the unity of the state. This view has it that the TNI's 
primary interest is its own enrichment (see McCulloch, 2000). To this 
end, the TNI's territorial function and its engagement in Indonesia's 
troubled provinces are primarily aimed at securing and enhancing the 
TNI's business interests, both legal and illegal. A competing view of 
the TNI's involvement in business is that it has simply been a means to 
an end; that it would be unable to survive without engaging in exten-
sive business activities; that this has been the TNI's practice since the 
days of the Revolution (1945-49); and that this practice, if not for-
mally endorsed, is ~ot actively discouraged by the government. The 
state recognizes that it cannot afford to sustain the TNI in its current 
form, providing as little as one-quarter of the TNI's total income 
(Widjojo, 2002; Evans, 2001; ICG, 2001). 
Of the TNI's total income, the 'black' income was thought by vari-
ous analysts to be in the order of double its legal off-line income. That 
is, assuming an online budget of approximately US$ one billion, legal 
business activities would bring income up to around two billion dol-
lars, while illegal income would add approximately that much again, 
to a total of US$ four billion or more. Of this, diverted funds were used 
to top up salaries, which were and continue to be fixed at unsustainably 
low levels, and for other discretionary purposes (ICG, 2001, P 13; see 
also McCulloch, 2000, pp 10, 12--14). Illustrating the extent of these 
activities and the problems in controlling them, in early 2001 the East 
Kalimantan police chief said that it was difficult to control petrol and 
diesel smuggling because he thought that only the Department of Reli-
gion was not involved (Gatra, 2001, p 89). Petrol and diesel fuel 
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smuggling has since become a significant issue in Indonesia-East Timor 
border relations. 
Use of off-line income 
The TNI's off-line or informal income is used for a range of purposes, 
although because most income is hidden, via the network of largely 
unaccountable 'charitable foundations' (yayasan) , the exact level of 
income and its usage are not precisely known. As with its manpower 
allocation, the TNI's business activities are spread across the archi-
pelago, although they tend to be concentrated in and around Jakarta 
and in the wealthier commodity-producing provinces. 
The off-line income derived by the branches of the TNI is used in 
three primary ways. The first is to buy capital goods and equipment for 
the TNI and its personnel, including the so-called 'welfare' function, 1 
the second is for reinvestment into the businesses, and the third is by 
way of cash payments, primarily to senior officers, although to TNI 
members of all ranks where they have access to differing levels of bus i-
ness activity or through patronage networks. Salaries for junior TNI 
personnel do not adequately cover their living costs, especially for those 
with families, so there is a 'top-up' function for their income through 
direct cash payments Of, more usually, free or subsidized goods, edu-
cation, health benefits and housing. Officers receive a slightly better 
income, but as a consequence of ingrained notions and requirements of 
patronage, they are expected to display significantly higher levels of 
wealth as well as to disburse such wealth, and this is well beyond their 
formal income. So they too receive cash payments from various sources, 
usually through military yayasan (from which profit is skimmed), from 
their own private businesses (which have TNI and other private busi-
ness directed towards them and which can place undue pressure on 
existing competition), and from percentage pay-offs from businesses 
under their 'protection'. 
The territorial structure is the prime institutional linkage through which 
wealth is created and distributed within the TN!. Members of the TNI 
who can manipulate their position, which basically means ranks of non-
commissioned officers and above, undertake 'favours' for more senior 
officers, and are in tum 'looked after'. Such 'services rendered' can 
The 'welfare function' includes any support services for TNI members, from hous-
ing, education and supplementing household necessities, to the provision of bullet-proof 
vests, spare parts and other equipment. 
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include quite conventional or mundane day-to-day military duties, as 
well as special favours. 2 In this sense, there is little distinction between 
official and non-official military duties, especially in the army. Being 
'looked after' frequently means having education provided for a sol-
dier's children, but can also mean cash payment or granting opportunities 
through which easy money can be earned, such as establishing legal or 
black businesses, paying commissions on or directing purchases to such 
businesses, or encouraging non-military businesses in dealing with such 
military-linked businesses. Rutherford (2001, p 193) also claimed (with 
considerable evidence) that, 
Military officers have a stake in the designation of certain areas as 'unstable'. 
Fonner commanders often live out their retirement in East Timor or Irian Jaya 
so they can reap the harvest of profitable business deals made in the areas under 
their command. 
Being 'looked after' does not necessarily correspond to the perform-
ance of particular favours, but is a type of irregular retainer that may 
increase in response to particularly notable acts. 
In what amounts to a patron-client relationship, junior officers may 
owe allegiance directly to officers several rungs up or outside their 
own direct command structure. This can then create confusion about 
where orders actually originate, as opposed to where they are supposed 
to originate. By way of illustration, a captain who might formally have 
line responsibility to a district colonel might acknowledge actual alle-
giance to an officer in a completely different command line. Such 
patron-client relations may initially be established when junior and 
senior officers work in the same command and then separate, but retain 
their mutual obligation. Or they may somewhat less frequently origi-
nate through association with officers already established in such a 
separated patron-client relationship: for example, a captain who owes 
allegiance to a brigadier-general in a separate line of command might 
bring in a colleague for a particular purpo,se, who would then also join 
that particular patron-client network (though usually at a lower level). 
Such patron-client relations are, according to a confidential intelli-
gence assessment, 'totally endemic' in the TN!. 
As a consequence of the pervasiveness of patron-client relations 
outside line commands, it can be difficult to know who to deal with in 
terms of issuing orders. That is, an officer who has formal line command 
2 
'Special favours' can include anything from personal services to military, business 
and criminal activities. 
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in one area may actually work for another, and may ignore or be unable 
to follow conventional line command orders. This in part explained 
why, although President Habibie had issued clear orders for the TNI 
and police to provide a secure environment for the ballot on independ-
ence in East Timor in 1999, the variously issued orders were subverted 
through the chain of command. What can at best be described as the 
official ambiguity of commitment to the referendum process by the 
TNI and police made this subversion that much easier. It also explains 
why, although one element of the TNI (for example, Kostrad) can claim 
(perhaps not entirely convincingly) to oppose illegal cross-border ac-
tivity, such activity can still continue with the support of other military 
elements. 
Income for these purposes is derived from three revenue streams. 
The first is businesses owned and operated by the branches of the TNI, 
usually through (still tax-exempt, but now theoretically auditable) 
yayasan and cooperatives, including businesses in natural resources 
and agribusiness, finance, transport, real estate, manufacturing and 
construction. The second is through 'grey' areas such as the leasing 
out (or imposition) of military services (for example, 'security') and 
surcharges imposed on purchases, along with mixing private and mili-
tary business interests. The third and most lucrative source of income 
is through the black market, in particular smuggling, especially of oil 
and oil products, and illegal mining and logging. 
History of TNI business in East Timor 
By the early 1990s, the TNI or individuals close to the TNI, such as 
President Suharto and his family, controlled virtually the entire economy 
of East Timor. This was one of the interconnected reasons why East 
Timor was so hard for the TNI to give up, and why it wishes to re-
establish economic links, either legal or illegal. By way of illustration, 
Suharto's son, the now disgraced Tommy, owned shares in Mobil Oil 
through the (Perth-based) Genindo Western Petroleum, which explored 
for oil off East Timor's south coast, as well as owning local sugar cane 
plantations. With his brother Bambang Trihadmodjo, he owned most 
of PT Elnusa, which in tum drilled for oil both on and offshore in East 
Timor, as well as operating a tanker fleet and air charter service to East 
Timor. Suharto crony (now jailed) Bob Hasan owned timber planta-
tions; Suharto's daughter Tutut owned the bottled water company 
Aquamor as well as coffee production, export and marble-mining com-
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panies; and Suharto's grandson Ari Sigit owned other bottled water 
ventures, textile manufacturing and, with Garda Paksi3 organizer Gil 
Alves, also collected the alcohol sticker tax. Two of the key planners 
and executors of the East Timor invasion, General Benny Murdani and 
Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, owned the Batara Indra Group, which in 
tum ran hotels, cinemas, sandalwood plantations and construction and 
infrastructure projects. Suharto' s youngest daughter Titiek was in busi-
ness with Colonel Tono Suratman, who was deeply implicated in the 
death and destruction around the 1999 ballot, in Kima Surya Lestari 
Mutiara. Titiek is the wife of Parabowo Subianto, who spent several 
years as an army officer in East Timor, mostly with the TNI's special 
forces, Kopassus. East Timor governor Abilio Soares owned the Anak 
Limbau Group, while Basilio de Araujo, who headed the pro-integra-
tion Forum Perdamai, Demokrasi dan Keadilan (FPDK) ran the 
Provincial Investment Board (Davies, in Kingsbury, 2003, p 193). As 
Time Magazine noted, this wealth, 
was built over three decades from a skein of companies, monopolies and control 
over vast sectors of economic activity in Indonesia. The Suharto family on its 
own or through corporate entities controls some 3.6 million hectares of real estate 
in Indonesia, an area larger than Belgium. That includes nearly 40% of the entire 
province of East Timor (Colmey and Liebhold, 1999). 
Legal cross-border trade 
Not surprisingly, a very large proportion of cross-border trade between 
East Timor and Indonesia is quite legal, at least so far as public recog-
nition of the practice, including the payment of taxes, is concerned. 
Apart from trade through markets and shipping through the port at Dili, 
all such cross-border trade arrives through the Technical Coordination 
Line (TCL) posts of Motaain on the Indonesian side and Batu Gade, 
Bobonaro district, on the East Timor side of the north coast of the is-
land. The Technical Coordination Line remains the functional border 
until a more formal arrangement is negotiated. Such trade from Indo-
nesia includes fuel (petrol, diesel and kerosene), manufactured goods, 
processed foods and, to a lesser extent, motor vehicles. Trade from 
East Timor primarily includes coffee beans and sandalwood. 
Garda Paksi (Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi - Young Guards to Uphold Integration) 
was a pro-Indonesian paramilitary civilian corps organized by TNI Special Forces 
(Kopas sus ) in East Timor. 
The TN] and East Timor 279 
There were also two markets, established within the TeL, which 
operated on a 'day pass' (stamp on the wrist) system. One such market, 
which attracted a few hundred people per day, was based at Batu Gade-
Motaain, with the other, attracting a few thousand people per day, was 
located at Turiskain, on the Lois River between Balibo and Maliana in 
Bobonaro district. These markets operated on alternate days - Mon-
day, Wednesday and Friday at Motaain, and Tuesday, Thursday and 
Saturday at Turiskain. The establishment of the markets at these two 
previously major refugee crossing points was primarily the idea of then 
Bobonaro District Administrator, Joao Vicente, and was intended to 
regulate cross-border trade by providing a legitimate and agreed site 
for trade between people on both sides of the border, and to reduce a 
demand for goods that was encouraging smuggling. However, after 
reaching an agreement with UN Military Observers, PKF command-
ers, the TNI and Indonesian National Police (Polri) to establish the 
markets, the East Timor government in Dili overrode the agreement 
and closed the markets. Vicente resigned in protest. Within days the 
government recognized the value of the markets (and that it did not 
technically have jurisdiction in that part of East Timor, which was with 
the UN) and agreed to allow their operation, which resumed almost 
immediately (although Vicente was not re-appointed). 
There had also been four market sites in Cova Lima district: on low-
lying land near the southern coast at Selele; to the north in lower 
mountains near Fatu Maen; at a relatively remote and inaccessible point 
in the mountains at Fato Lulie; and near the border with Bohonaro 
district, deep in a remote and largely inaccessible part of the mountains 
at Lebos. It should be noted that access to the latter three points, for 
local people, was almost exclusively by foot or pony, which limited 
them to around 60 kilograms of tradeable goods (for example, coffee 
beans). The roads in this part of East Timor were generally pOOf, for 
the most part not sealed or deeply broken up, and most commonly just 
potholed and rutted dirt or rock, in places extremely steep, and often 
little more than narrow tracks running along precipices at altitudes of 
up to 1,500 metres. The almost complete inability of wheeled trans-
port, apart from more competent four-wheel-drive vehicles, to access 
this part of East Timor meant that local people had very limited access 
to the outside world, and it was usually easier to access points across 
the border in West Timor than to come to towns, further in distance, in 
East Timor. 
While Bobonaro district 4ad implemented a 'day pass' system, such 
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a system had not been implemented in Co va Lima, which meant that 
any trade across the border, even for limited purposes, had to be con-
ducted under a conventional visa. Apart from the three-day delay in 
Dili for obtaining an Indonesian visa (assuming people could get there, 
which from Cova Lima was often uncertain due to the extremely poor 
condition of the roads), such a visa cost US$35, and was generally 
good for only one visit. East Timorese visas were available at the bor-
der, but cost US$25. In a region where most people were lucky to earn 
an average of US$l per day, the visa system was highly prohibitive, 
and consequently encouraged illegal border crossing and smuggling. 
Following a series of problems (discussed below) and a consequent 
low level of legal use of the border markets in Cova Lima, they were 
closed in early 2003. This only further encouraged illegal border crossing 
and smuggling. Meanwhile, local people who had family on both sides 
of the border, or who in some cases even farmed land across the border, 
continued to cross illegally to avoid the prohibitive visa costs, and when 
doing so often undertook a small amount of trade while they were there, 
avoiding the compulsory 5% tax on the value of goods officially cross-
ing the border. This tax applied to general dutiable goods, but was less 
than the excise attached to soft drinks (US$0.50 per litre), alcohol 
(US$I.50 per litre) and tobacco (US$15 per kilogram), electronic goods 
and motorcycles (10%), or perfume and cars (15%) (UNTAET, 2000). 
While the border market system appeared to help regulate local cross-
border trade, it was not free from problems, especially from the 
Indonesian side. At the markets themselves, militia members openly 
operated stalls (at the front of the market at Turiskain in the best sell-
ing spot) and imposed a 'tax' or surcharge on Indonesian stallholders. 
It is worth noting that the militia that was active in 2003 was drawn 
from the same cadre base as the 13 militias that comprised the anti-
independence movement of 1999, but that it had been formed into a 
single organization, the Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (Integration Strug-
gle Troops - PPI). The PPI, originally formed as the overarching militia 
organization in July-August 1999 ahead of the East Timor ballot on 
independence, was formally headed by Joao Tavares, although it was 
understood that his second in command, Eurico Guterres, had assumed 
operational control by 2001. Further, at Motaain and Tursikain, Indo-
nesian police also charged all entrants to the market a 'fee' of US$0.10 
(or Rp 1,000) per person, while at the markets in Cava Lima, when they 
were open, they imposed a 'fee' of US$O.25 (or Rp 2,000) per person. 
This led to resentment when market-goers were asked to pay tax on the 
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goods they had bought, their response being they had already 'paid 
tax' (UNMO, 2003a). This was confirmed by Joao Vicente, who had 
closely monitored the markets (Vicente, 2003). 
The TNI, trade and smuggling 
Not surprisingly, given its limited revenue base, the militia also im-
posed a 'tax' upon West Timorese market stallholders and, beyond this, 
was involved in smuggling. In part, the imposition of a 'tax' and smug-
gling directly funded its own activities. However, given the militia's 
client relationship with the TNI, a proportion of the money raised by 
the militia was forwarded to its patrons, who were local TNI officers. 
The TNI also provided goods directly or through front companies for 
sale both in the markets and for smuggling across the border. 
Both the TNI and Polri (the Indonesian National Police) also prof-
ited from the border trade in that they controlled the money exchange 
in the region. The (illegal) rate for US dollars at the border was Rupiah 
8,000, which was close enough to the market value at that time (the US 
dollar had recently slumped to Rp7,850, but was otherwise generally 
just above Rp8,OOO). However, the rate for Rupiah was at RplO,OOO to 
the US dollar, making a neat 20% profit on all financial transactions. 
Not only was this exchange rate mechanism highly favourable to mak-
ing large, rapid profits, it was not in the least bit hidden. Indeed, at the 
Motaain border police post, uniformed Polri were openly buying and 
selling money across the police post counter. This engagement in ille-
gal money changing was not unusual for Polri in West Timor, which 
had an established history of extensive engagement in illegal businesses, 
such as gambling and prostitution, particularly in the provincial capital 
of Kupang. Indeed, Polri and the TNI had a history of armed conflict 
over their attempts to control or monopolize illegal businesses in Kupang, 
paralleling such sporadic anned conflict in other parts of the country. 
Polri formally separated from what was then the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - ABRI) 
on 1 April 1999 . However, Polri remained subservient to the TNI (ABRI 
renamed after the split) and also remained under TNI operational com-
mand in conflict areas such as West Timor (Davies, 2001, p 11; see 
also Kingsbury, 2003, pp 134-136). In the West Timor border district, 
however, there was little tension between Polri and the TNI, as most 
TNI here were from Kostrad and on a high rate of rotation, unlike the 
Territorial army, which was permanently based in West Timor, although 
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generally away from the immediate border area due to its lack of mili-
tary competence. 
In Cava Lima district, and to some extent in Bobonaro district, smug-
gling was complicated by the various agendas of the militias and their 
TNI patrons. Despite the official position of the Indonesian govern-
ment, ie it recognizes the independence of East Timor and wishes to 
work with it in a constructive manner (and noting the extent to which 
East Timorese leaders have tried to accommodate various Indonesian 
sensitivities and concerns, such as over trials of TNI officers impli-
cated in atrocities in East Timor), many amongst Indonesia's political 
elite, certainly within the TNI, and not least among the militia, retain 
irredentist aspirations for East Timor. 
Such irredentist claims have found support from no less a figure than 
Indonesia's then Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, who reiterated 
the militia allegation that UNAMET 'cheated' in the conduct of East 
Timor's 1999 ballot and that the East Timorese military resistance or-
ganization, Falintil, engaged in armed activities (Tedjasukmana, 2000). 
Similar claims have been made by a number of other political figures 
in Indonesia in an attempt to de-legitimize the outcome of the ballot, in 
turn attempting to re-Iegitimize irredentist claims. As field coordinator 
of (and participant in) a large NGO observer group to that ballot, the 
author confirms that UNAMET conducted an almost entirely unblem-
ished electoral process, while the TNI-supported militias killed, raped, 
burned homes and intimidated in the pre-ballot period. That is, there 
were massive irregularities in the ballot process, but they were con-
ducted by the TNI-backed militias. Similarly, with Falintil in voluntary 
cantonment (confirmed first-hand by the author), there was no military 
activity by that force during the campaign period (and only one signifi-
cant incident prior to the campaign period, in retaliation for the TNI 
murder of two youths in Bobonaro district who chose not to join the 
local militia). 
To this end, the frequent psychological warfare operations ('psyops') 
being conducted by militia and TNI across the border were intended 
to, and had the effect of, ensuring that many people in the East Timor 
border region felt quite insecure (Vicente, 2003; da Carmo, 2003; 
Adriano, 2003). An example of such 'psyops' was the repeated state-
ment that: 'We plan to bring the Red and White [Indonesian flag] back 
to East Timor'. This was broadcast on West Timor radio, found on 
documents circulated across the border, and stated by militia members 
in interaction with East Timorese, usually while engaging in illegal 
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trade. Such 'psyops' were probably at their most intense in the East 
Timorese enclave of Oecussi, on the north coast of West Timor, but 
also quite pronounced in Cava Lima, and somewhat less noticeable in 
Bobonaro (probably due to the higher profile of the PKF in this area). 
However, while Bobonaro was spared some of the 'psyops' , on 4 J anu-
ary 2003 between 20 and 30 armed militia members wearing TNI 
uniforms (without insignia) and carrying automatic weapons harassed 
villagers near the town of Atsabe, south-west of Dili, (with a number 
being captured by villagers). This was followed by an attack involving 
a smaller group of armed men on a bus on 24 February, with another 
group attacking a PKF patrol on 27 February 2003. There were also 
numerous (though unofficial) reports of similar incidents in Bobonaro 
and Cava Lima districts (UNMO, 2003b; BPU, 2003). While 'psyops' 
were an important part of the incursions, it was also likely that militia 
incursions into East Timor were designed to gather intelligence on the 
presence of PKF and Forcas de Defesa Timor L' este (FDTL, or East 
Timor Defence Force) troops, a detachment of the latter being based at 
Cova Lima, near the town of Zumalai, some 40 kilometres from the 
border. 
In large part, the extent of militia infiltration and smuggling could 
not be controlled due to the small size of the RDTL Border Patrol Unit 
(BPU) - about 165 at the time of writing, expected to rise to around 
200 by the end of 2003. This was further complicated by the BPU's 
relatively brief training, its lack of basic equipment including guns, 
water canteens, food and permanent shelter (which at Batu Gade was 
constructed, as a favour, by the Australian PKF battalion). The BPU 
had, according to the local BPU instructor, 'no capacity for pro-active 
interdiction', which was critical to securing the border (Shappf, 2003). 
However, with the introduction of the BPUs, the PKF was intended to 
scale down its presence in the border areas, and take a less 'robust' 
profile (this term being used to describe the Australian PKF presence 
by a senior US UNMO in November 2000), meaning that infiltration 
was increasing rather than decreasing. As a consequence of cross-bor-
der infiltration, however, at the end of May ~003 the UN decided· to 
slow down the rate of PKF withdrawal from the border region, extend-
ing the commission of the two battalions and international police near 
the border until the middle of 2004. 
In that the militia increased its infiltration activity and engaged in 
'psyops', this seemed to run counter to its engagement in cross-border 
trade and smuggling. At one level, these activities do appear to be 
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irreconcilable. Relations with partner smugglers and border traders were 
generally positive, and where there remained an element of intimida-
tion it was to indicate the power differential between the two groups, 
which recalls elements of traditional relationships across different so-
cial groups. A number of incursions by militia were also in smuggling 
parties (this was established when the parties were arrested and the 
militia members' identities were confinned), and indeed such smug-
gling parties might have been largely composed of militia, although 
with a number of new members who were not formally identified with 
the' 1999 generation' . In that business engagement clashed with politi-
cal opposition, the need to raise money was of primary importance to 
the militias, and given the 'seller's market' nature of arrangements, did 
not strongly conflict with the respective positions in a 'power relation-
ship'. In this respect, what appeared on the surface to be competing 
agendas for the militia and their TNI bosses actually worked. 
Apart from the difficulty in accessing the main towns of East Timor, 
the costs of crossing the border, and taxes, according to two Suai lia 
nain, traditional guardians and mediators of rules and custom (Ospina 
and Rohe, 2001, p 38; da Carmo, 2003; Adriano, 2003), it was in many 
cases simply 'easier' for many local people to engage in illegal cross-
border trade than to trade legally. The lower cost of goods from West 
Timor, and their greater accessibility, combined to make smuggling an 
attractive proposition. However, they did recognize that the infiltra-
tion of militia members complicated the situation, and indeed noted 
that most of the local community wanted the border to remain closed in 
order to limit militia infiltration. Adriano and da Carmo identified the 
militia members as belonging to Laksaur Merah Putih (LMP), which 
was responsible for the murder of at least 300 people, whose names are 
listed on a memorial to 'Black September' in Suai, and probably many 
more throughout Cova Lima in September 1999. They further said that 
the members of LMP were from West Timor and that they were 'native 
Indonesians' (that is, not East Timorese). Adriano and da Carmo also 
said that, amongst the smugglers, were men they identified as mem-
bers of the TNI, although these men wore civilian clothing. They also 
said that the TNI controlled the exchange between dollars and rupiah. 
In terms of goods being smuggled across the border into Cova Lima, 
da Carmo and Adriano said that this included motor vehicles (espe-
cially motorcycles), cigarettes, fuel (petrol, diesel and kerosene), 
electrical and electronic goods, salt, sugar, rice and clothes. The mo-
torcycles being smuggled across the border included both new and, 
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more commonly, used vehicles, many of which did not come with any 
papers, indicating they had been stolen. The motorcycles with papers 
may have been purchased, but may also have been extorted from their 
owners. Regarding the prevalence of smuggling in this district, the au-
thor actually witnessed a smuggler on the border near Lebos, where 
the 'road' (track) runs very close to West Timor. This smuggler looked 
as though he was about to pick up a supply of fuel, if the dozen or so 
plastic containers strapped to his pony's back were any indication. Upon 
catching sight of the author's vehicle, the smuggler dashed down the 
side of a very steep slope to avoid what he seemed to think might be 
apprehension. The point at which the smuggler was crossing was di-
rectly opposite a post of TN I Kostrad Battalion 721. 
A UN official stationed in Cova Lima also confirmed that there was 
a lucrative trade in smuggling alcohol across the border, saying its ap-
peal was due to the fact that it was cheaper than buying what was often 
the same alcohol in East Timor. This indicated that no tax was being 
paid on the alcohol in Indonesia and hence, having come via TNI and 
militias, it had come through import/export businesses directly con-
nected with the TNI. Apart from vehicles, da Carmo and Adriano 
described most smuggled goods as comprising basic necessities. Traded 
or smuggled goods from East to West Timor included coffee, sandal-
wood, candles, peanuts and oil nuts. The parish priest at Suai, Reverend 
Manuel Simao Barreto, added that timber, corrugated iron and other 
building materials were also smuggled from West Timor into East Timor. 
He said the actual site of the sale of smuggled goods of which he was 
aware was always just inside the West Timor border. 
Rev Barreto also noted Cova Lima's vulnerability to militia/smug-
gler infiltration, primarily due to the physical isolation of the district-
from the rest of East Timor, to its poor roads and its proximity to cross-
ing points into West Timor (Barreto, 2003). The author's experience of 
Cava Lima's roads confirmed the problems of access, with only one 
being accessible between Suai and the capital, Dili, via Ainaro, and 
even then being in very poor condition: in many places it was what 
would be considered a four-wheel-drive track, and was largely closed 
for the period of the wet season (November-May). The three other 
'roads' to Cava Lima were generally not traversable by conventional 
vehicle, and in some cases only by foot or pony. Rev Barreto noted that 
emergency relief supplies being distributed by the church were air-
lifted into Suai, although there was also a weekly UN ferry service 
from Dili. 
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Rev Barreto said that smuggling across the border used what had 
previously been conventional trade routes between East and West Timor, . 
and that this was largely driven by necessity on the part of the East 
Timorese. In particular, he noted that food insecurity often forced peo-
ple from Cova Lima to buy goods from West Timor. He also noted that 
LMP members dominated the cross-border smuggling: many of them 
were on a list he had of 48 militia who had been clearly identified as 
having committed major crimes, such as murder and rape, on 6 Sep-
tember 1999. Rev Barreto said that the list of 48 did not include' people 
who had committed less serious crimes, such as the burning of homes. 
Lesser crimes, he said, could be forgiven by the church. However, he 
said that it was not possible to pardon the perpetrators of the more 
serious crimes (this interview taking place next to the sites where Fr 
Hilario Maderia, Fr Tarcisius Dewanto and Fr Francisco Soares had 
been murdered). 'There is still a very significant militia threat' , he said. 
As with militia who had been arrested in Bobonaro district, Rev Barreto 
said that reports to him about sightings of militia by villagers noted 
they also wore Indonesian military uniforms without badges, and car-
ried automatic weapons. This conformed to the description of militia 
members arrested by the Thai battalion stationed in Cova Lima (BPU, 
2003) and the Australian battalion in Bobonaro (UNMO, 2003b). 
Despite it being three-and-a-half years since the destruction of Suai, 
the town had still not returned to normal, which was noticeable from 
the fact that around half the houses in Suai and surrounding districts 
were still burnt shells as a consequence of the events of 1999. Rev 
Barreto said that many people had not returned to Suai because of con-
tinuing fear of militia raids, because they were sympathetic to militias 
and hence were still in West Timor, because they were continuing to be 
forced to stay in West Timor, or because they were dead. He said there 
were approximately 5-7,000 people from Cova Lima still in West Timor 
who were not connected with the militia. Militia members in this area 
continued to extort 'protection' payments from refugees in West Timor, 
especially if they wanted to return to East Timor. As a consequence of 
militia incursions, 'psyops' and smuggling, Rev Barreto said that: 'Se-
curity is most important, and it will become urgent when UNMISET 
leaves the country' . 
Smuggling across the border in Bobonaro district was generally similar 
to that in Cova Lima district (although there were no reports of motor-
cycles being smuggled). In particular, the TNI was said to be directly 
involved in the smuggling of sugar and rice from Belu kabupaten to 
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Bobonaro district (Anon [a], 2003). Beyond such food staples, the 
smuggling of fuel was also extensive, if primarily on a small or local 
scale, and undertaken and controlled by TNI non-commissioned offic-
ers (corporals and sergeants). The attraction in smuggling fuel was that 
in Indonesia it cost about one-fifth of the retail price in East Timor, and 
even less when purchased wholesale. By way of illustration, kerosene 
was officially Rp600, or US$0.06 per litre (depending on the exchange 
rate), although up to Rp 1,100 in Atambua; diesel was Rp 1,150 per litre 
and premium petrol Rp 1,550 per litre. In East Timor, by comparison, it 
was around US$O.50 a litre for diesel and premium petrol (circa Rp4-
5,000, depending on exchange rates) and around 60 cents (circa 
Rp5-6,OOO) for kerosene (Anon [a], 2003). So rampant was the smug-
gling across the border that at one stage there was actually a fuel shortage 
in Belu kabupaten (district) in West Timor, which abuts East Timor 
(ETAN, 2002). 
The supply of fuel from West Timor has been a recurring theme in East 
Timor. In one ironic arrangement, in the early phase of the PKF in 2000, 
according to senior UNTAET staff, the New ZealandB attalion then stationed 
in Cova Lima was supplied with petrol from West Timor through the TNI 
(see Kingsbury, 2000). This petrol, and subsequently most of the legal fuel 
to East Timor, was supplied by the Indonesian state-owned oil company 
Pertamina (at US$0.34 a litre wholesale, or nearly triple the retail price in 
West Timor), through its licensed distributor PT Jagad Adilaut, located at 
Bima and Kupang. The West Timor branch ofPT J agad Adilaut was run by 
Purwo Subekti, while PT J agad Adilaut was headquartered in Jakarta. The 
Pertamina depot in Dili also housed Indonesia's diplomatic mission until 
early 2003, and according to a UN security report was the site of intelli-
gence activities (Dodd, 2001), which meant the involvement of TNI's 
Military Strategic Intelligence Organization (Baden ABRI Intelijen 
Strategis), which was represented throughout the TNI's Territorial struc-
ture and which had close links with the TNI's Special Forces (Kopassus). 
Further cementing this connection, in September 2003, a senior officer 
from Indonesia's National Intelligence Agency (Baden Intelijen Nasional 
- BIN), Ahmad Bey Sofwan, was appointed ambassador to East Timor. 
BIN and BAIS retained very close working relations. Former Defence 
Minister Juwono Sudarsono noted that Pertamina 'play[ed] a role as a 
funding channel to the TNI' (Fabiola, 2003). Regardless of the TNI's 
direct link to PT J agad Adilaut, it could in any case purchase fuel from this 
distributor at the wholesale price and transport it in TNI fuel tankers, 
selling it at well above Indonesia's internally capped retail price. 
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Figure 1. TNI command structure in Kabupaten Belu, West Timor. 
TNI's organizational structure in West Timor 
The TNI organizational structure in West Timor (see Figure 1) allows 
perhaps the clearest insight into the focus and purpose of the TNI in 
that part of Indonesia. Most notable was the promotion of Lieutenant-
Colonel Djoko Subandrio from head of kecamatan-Ievel District Military 
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Command (Komando Distrik Militer - Kodim) 1605 Belu to full Colo-
nel and head of the Strategic Command Centre based at Atambua. In 
particular, although this move was announced as the creation of a stra-
tegic command centre (and at one stage touted as a possible new Kodarn), 
it was formally identified to UNMO officers by the TNI as a 'satgas' 
(satuan tugas), which is a generic term for 'function unit', though more 
commonly understood as a 'duty unit'. The term 'satgas' is used to 
identify any special-purpose unit, ranging from intelligence to special 
operations, to militia control. It is also unusual within the TNI for a 
Kodim head to receive a second tour of duty at a particular post and to 
be promoted at the same time. It is equally unusual for the TNI to 
create a strategic command centre, this being outside the TNI's con-
ventional command structure, especially while at the same time 
maintaining the original Kodim, in this case Kodim 1605 at Atambua, 
under Lt-Col Anip. Similarly, it is most unusual to have a colonel ap-
pointed to a geographic position located so close to another, seemingly 
parallel, colonel (Col Moeswarno Moesanip) at the kabupaten-Ievel, 
battalion -strength Military Resort (that is, Garrison) Command 
(Komando Resort Militer - Korem) 162, at Kupang, in the western 
part of West Timor. It is worth noting that the TNI's Military Liaison 
Officer, Lieutenant Fauzi Nurdin, who was part of Army Strategic Re-
serve (Komando Strategik Angkatan Daerah - Kostrad) Battallion 321 
stationed along the border in Belu kabupaten, said that if the author 
had particular inquiries about the TNI in West Timor they should ini-
tially be directed to Colonel Moeswarno Moesanip at Korem 162 in 
Kupang, and thence to Major-General Agus Suyitno at brigade strength 
Military Command Area (Komando Daerah Militer - Kodam) X Udayana 
at Denpasar, Bali (which is ordinarily headed by a Brigadier-General). 
This completely bypassed the most senior local officer, Col Djoko, the 
Border Taskforce Security Commander, which would have otherwise 
been in accordance with conventional organizational lines of command 
but which, thereby, located this geographically senior officer outside 
the nominal command structure. This in turn indicated Col Djoko's 
'special' or non-conventional military status and role. 
Col Djoko had -succeeded Lt-Col Sigit Yuwono as TNI head at 
Atambua, where the latter had been executive chairman of the commit-
tee overseeing the 1999 influx of refugees to West Timor (Ketua 
Pelaksana Drusan Pengungsi Timtim) (McDonald et al, 2002) and, as 
such, was one of the key organizers of the forcing of East Timorese 
into West Timor. Lt-Col Djoko was the regional commander appointed 
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to head Kodim 1605 when, on 6 September 2000, PPI militia based in 
and around Atambua attacked the Atambua office of the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), murdering three UNHCR employees. 
Lt-Col Djoko said that he would crack down on the militias as a conse-
quence of the attack, which saw the UN withdraw from West Timor. 
However, at a weapons handover by the militia on 26 September, mili-
tia members seized back their weapons from Polri, who did not attempt 
to stop them. Given the pre-existing (and very well documented) links 
between the TNI, and to a lesser extent Polri, and the militias, it is 
highly likely that Lt-Col Djoko had direct administrative control over 
the militias at that time, and indeed that this was a primary focus of his 
original appointment, having succeeded Lt-Col Sigit in this role. One 
credible TNI observer said that it 'can probably be assumed that he 
was involved in training and arming the militias for forays into East 
Timor' (Anon [d], 2003). The establishment of a satgas at Atambua, 
and the continued public presence of militia members there and nearby, 
suggested that Col Djoko's new position was primarily to run the mili-
tias and their activities both within West Timor and across the border 
into East Timor. As late as May 2002, the military commander at Kupang, 
Col Moeswamo, said that there were up to 20,000 militia still in West 
Timor (JP, 2002), although this figure almost certainly included fami-
lies and sympathizers (active PPI militia members were limited to perhaps 
3,000, based on various unofficial estimates). In terms of the contem-
porary presence of militia in TNI areas, one militia member, clearly 
dressed in TNI boots, camouflage pants and TNI-type sweatshirt (black 
with yellow writing on the back) calmly walked past the UNMO liai-
son post at Motaain while the author was there. Indeed, given his stature 
and bearing, this person would have been indistinguishable from an 
ordinary (if tall and muscular) Kostrad soldier but for his hair, which 
fell well past his shoulders. It is possible, of course, that this person 
was in fact TNI. However, if that was the case, given the length of his 
hair, it should be noted that the only group in the TNI that has long hair 
is Group IV of the Special Forces (Kopassus). Group IV is the 'dirty 
tricks' unit of Kopassus, and specializes in covert activities, including 
intelligence gathering, assassination and the training of militias. Alter-
natively, he could have been milsus (militer khussus - special military), 
who are usually former Kopassus personnel who have resigned but 
come back as freelance agents for particular projects. Such milsus were 
known to be operating in East Timor in 1999 in the organization of 
militias. If such milsus were retained to oversee the operational aspects 
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of the militia in West Timor, they would operate through the Satgas 
under the command of Col Djoko. 
Other militia encountered in Atambua were less physically impres-
sive, being shorter, more unkempt and, in one case at least, less 
disciplined (although making clear he knew the author's name upon 
arrival in Atambua, thus employing the type of 'psyops' common in 
East Timor in 1999).· This more unkempt militiaman was almost cer-
tainly connected to a Polri Sergeant-Major, Adonis Apollo, whom the 
author met at the Motaain UNMO post and who was later identified as 
being a former militia organizer in Maliana in East Timor in 1999 
(UNMO,2003b). 
In terms of TNI deployment in the first half of 2003, Kodim 1605 at 
Atambua comprised TNI Territorial (non-specialist) troops and militia 
members; Kostrad Battalion 321 of around 700 men was located along 
the border in Belu kabupaten opposite Bobonari district, physically 
separate from but within the same command formation as the Territo-
rial troops; Kostrad Battalion 721 (also around 700 men) was located 
along the border in Boas kabupaten opposite Cova Lima, similarly or-
ganized in regard to Territorials; and a 'detachment' of Kostrad battalion 
(Bn) 407 was located at the border around the enclave of Oecussi on 
the north coast of West Timor, again linked to the Territorials. There 
are formally two detachments to a battalion, although a detachment 
can in practice be up to 500 men out of a 700-800-man battalion, or 
any group at less than full battalion strength (due to other deployments 
or staffing issues). Along with Bn 407, absorbed into the Territorial 
structure, were also members of the since disbanded Bn 745, which 
was composed largely of East Timorese and was based in Los Palos 
district at the eastern end of East Timor. This was confinned by a member 
of Bn 745 who made himself known to the author at Kefamenanu, near 
Oecussi. Bn 745 had a reputation for considerable brutality in any case, 
and in its withdrawal from Los Palos in late September 1999, mur-
dered the people it came across on the road back, including a European 
journalist in the suburb of Becora in Dili, as well as burning everything 
not already destroyed. The author had earlier encountered members of 
Battalion 745 at the Motaain border post, mixed with Kostrad troops 
stationed there at that time (January 2000). 
According to Lt Fauzi, the TNI intended to reduce its forces along 
the border from mid-2003, corresponding to a similar draw-down by 
the PKF (the operational function of which was renewed until the end 
of 2004). According to Fauzi, the existing Kostrad battalions in West 
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Timor were expected to be deployed to Aceh (where at the time of the 
interview the TNI was building up its forces in preparation for a major 
assault against Free Aceh Movement rebels, which came just a few 
days later). The replacement was intended to reduce the three Kostrad 
battalions to three detachments, not including Territorial troops. The 
difference in numbers, Lt Fauzi said, would be made up by police and 
would be under police command. While on the surface this looked like 
a 'civilianizing' of the border, the effect could have been to reinforce 
an even more militarized version of the status quo. Indonesia's Na-
tional Police (Polri) often function in effect as a part of the army (Davies, 
2001, p 24), especially the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) and Polri's 'counter-
terrorist' unit, Gegana (which at the time of writing was being used in 
military operations in Aceh). More critically, in operational terms, nomi-
nally police 'BKO' units (bawa kendali operasi - under operational 
control) comprise highly trained soldiers from Kostrad and Kopassus 
who are seconded to Polri and are formally identified as police, even 
though they are trained and equipped as soldiers and perform a purely 
military function (also used at the time of writing in Aceh). The struc-
ture was in place for such BKO units to be operational in West Timor, 
and given demonstrably close links between PPI militia and Polri at 
the border, it would be possible to move to such an arrangement with-
out disrupting strategic or tactical considerations. 
Notably, too, the Polri relationship with the militia was close and 
active until the ending of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, and 
remains active at the time of writing. Furthermore, Polri's active engage-
ment in illegal trade, including money changing, and its history of 
engagement with running illegal businesses in West Timor, mean that 
the functional positioning of Polri as a state agent parallels that of the 
TNI in relation to a range of border-related issues, notably where the 
more permanent Territorial troops did not have a presence. 
This potential military imbalance, and the pressure being applied 
across the border by way of 'psyops', was widely expected in East 
Timor to play a role in negotiations between the government of Indo-
nesia and the government of East Timor over the formalization of the 
demarcation of the border between the two states and the conditions of 
passage across it, including access to the enclave of Oecussi. Although 
there was no formal reason why such negotiations had not already be-
gun, the Indonesian government had continued to defer them to an 
unspecified future time. This 'future time' was thought to be after the 
UN had formally ended its presence in East Timor, or at least after the 
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PKF had been formally removed. If this was the case, Indonesia would 
be well placed to step up pressure, through means that it would be able 
to deny formally, to achieve an outcome on border issues it regarded as 
most suiting its various requirements. Indeed, if one were to take the 
irredentist claim seriously as a medium- to longer-term proposition, 
negotiations over the border could open the way to a broader claim, 
including such matters as territorial waters, claims to offshore mineral 
(oil and gas) rights, and the repatriation of remaining pro-integrationist 
militia members. Based on the destabilizing activities (political oppor-
tunism, public disturbances) and calls for reintegration with Indonesia 
by the Jakarta-backed (and deceptively named) Committee for the Popu-
lar Defence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor - CPD-RDTL 
(see Kingsbury, 2002, p 164), the repatriation of remaining pro-inte-
gration forces would act as a further means of destabilizing East Timor's 
already uncertain political environment. In this there was a view that 
irredentist claims could be achieved without a further formal military 
incursion, but through holding a future ballot on voluntary re-incorpo-
ration into Indonesia. With widespread post-independence aspirations 
within East Timor not being met (in many cases because they exceed 
even that which was available under Indonesia), some East Timorese 
look back on the period of Indonesian occupation with an almost child-
like sense of nostalgia. Given the political naivety of many East Timorese 
(although this quality is far from exclusive to East Timorese), there is 
considerable scope for gathering political support for simplistic solu-
tions to complex problems, which is the CPD-RDTL's stock-in-trade 
(and historically the prime vehicle of populist/fascist movements). 
The activities of the TNI and the PPI militia, then, serve a number of 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing functions, which are consistent 
with the profile of the TNI both as the former occupier of East Timor 
and in terms of the complex of agendas that inform both its Territorial 
presence throughout Indonesia and that of its specialist divisions. The 
first of these interrelated functions is both legal and illegal business 
activities, which help fund the TNI, and in this case the otherwise fi-
nancially marginally supported PPI militia. This accords not just with 
the contemporary localized practice of the TNI, which as an actor and 
as a patron benefits from it, but also parallels similar legal and illegal 
business practices throughout the archipelago and in particular where 
the TNI has a long-established high-level presence, such as in Aceh 
and West Papua. Securing an income requires a high level of local poli-
tical control to ensure that local constituents do not object too vocally 
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to such practices. In the case of West Timor, this is achieved by PPI 
militia control of refugee camps, and high levels of intimidation in the 
wider region. Thus once secured, the PPI militia and its TNI patrons 
can engage in their (nominal) core function, which is 'defence', in this 
case understood as intelligence gathering and psychological and 
destabilization operations aimed at the 'enemy'. This in tum strength-
ens the PPI militiaJTNI position that continues to inform issues of border 
relations, in particular the timing and scope for negotiations over the 
shape and character of the still-to-be-formalized border between East 
Timor and Indonesia. In the final sense, all of this establishes a proactive 
position from which to facilitate the possible re-integration of East Timor 
into Indonesia, through unsubtle 'encouragement'. This in tum ration-
alizes the core function of the TNI, and addresses that sense of legitimacy 
that the TNI, and even the PPI militia, feels about itself. Such 'legiti-
macy' , however, papers over a range of self-serving interests, not least 
that of economic benefit. However, this locally reconstructed sense of 
'legitimacy' further strengthens the TNI's claim to participation in the 
political process around what it regards as the core issues of the state, 
and in which it has demonstrated that it intends to take a long-term 
leading role. This in turn rationalizes the TNI's high profile in Indone-
sian political society and further helps protect its self-serving economic 
interests. 
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